We introduce several bases of the set of TU games. Given a coalition T , Yokote et al. (2013) introduced the commander game in which a coalition including 1 player in T obtains payoff. On the other hand, Shapley (1953) introduced the unanimity game in which a coalition including all players in T obtains payoff. We consider the intermediate between the two games. We introduce a game in which a coalition including k players in T obtains payoff, where 1 ≤ k ≤ |T |. We show that, if there is a specific relationship between the size of coalition T and k, we can construct a new basis. By using the new basis, we give sufficient conditions under which the Shapley value coincides with the prenucleolus.
Introduction
This paper is a complement study to Yokote et al. (2013) . Yokote et al. (2013) introduced a new basis that has two desirable properties. First, when we express a game by a linear combination of the basis, the coefficients related to singletons coincide with the Shapley value. Second, the basis induces the null space of the Shapley value. The basis consists of the commander game defined as follows: the commander game defined for T assigns 1 to a coalition including 1 player in T . On the other hand, the well-known unanimity game (Shapley (1953) ) is defined as follows: the unanimity game defined for T assigns 1 to a coalition including all players in T . The above games represent two extreme cases: a coalition includes only 1 player, or all players. In this paper, we consider the intermediate between the two cases and introduce new bases.
We introduce the following game: the game defined for coalition T assigns 1 to a coalition including k players in T , where 1 ≤ k ≤ |T |. We show that, if there is a specific relationship between the size of coalition T and k, then we can construct a basis. This result includes the bases of the commander games and the unanimity games as special cases.
We focus on the basis that consists of the games with the following property: the game defined for coalition T with even number of players assigns 1 to a coalition including half players in T . By using this basis, we give sufficient conditions under which the Shapley value coincides with the prenucleolus. We show that the games defined for coalitions with even number of players span the set of all games satisfying PS property, introduced by Kar et al. (2009) . As they proved, under PS property, the Shapley value and the prenucleolus coincide. We also give new sufficient condition of the coincidence. The results enable us to construct a linear subspace where the coincidence holds. For other approaches to the subspace, see Chang and Tseng (2011) . This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce notations and definitions. In Section 3, we prove that the set of new simple games constitutes the basis. In Section 4, we give sufficient conditions under which the Shapley value coincides with the prenucleolus by using the new basis.
Preliminary
A TU game is a pair of (N, v) , where N is a finite set of n players and v is a function from 2 N to R and satisfies v(∅) = 0. The value v(S), S ∈ 2 N , represents the attainable payoff for players in S when they cooperate. In the remaining part, we fix player set N . So, for simplicity, we write v instead of (N, v). Let Γ denote the set of all games with player set N . For any two games v, w ∈ Γ and α ∈ R, we define the sum and the scalar multiplication as follows: (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S) for all S ∈ 2 N , and (αv)(S) = αv(S) for all S ∈ 2 N . Then, we can identify the set Γ as 2 n − 1 dimensional vector space. For a set of games {v
define the set spanned by the games as follows:
We consider a desirable rule that distributes the total attainable payoff v(N ). Such a rule is described as a solution function. A solution function ψ assigns an n-dimensional payoff vector to each game v ∈ Γ. In the remaining part, we focus on the following two solution functions: the Shapley value and the prenucleolus. For a player i ∈ N , a game v ∈ Γ and a coalition S ⊆ N , i / ∈ S, we define the marginal contribution of player i to coalition S as follows:
The Shapley value, introduced by Shapley (1953) , is defined as follows: for
For any v ∈ Γ, S ⊆ N , S ̸ = ∅, and x ∈ R n , we define the excess of coalition S with respect to x in v as follows:
For any x and y ∈ R n , y ≥ lex x means that y is greater than x in the lexicographic ordering of R n . Let θ(x) = (θ 1 (x), θ 2 (x), . . . , θ 2 n −1 (x)) ∈ R 2 n −1 denote the sequence of excess of S ⊆ N , S ̸ = ∅, with respect to x, where θ t (x) ≥ θ t+1 (x) for all t, 1 ≤ t ≤ 2 n − 2. The prenucleolus ν, introduced by Schmeidler (1969) ,is defined as follows: for any v ∈ Γ N ,
where
For a game v ∈ Γ and β ∈ R n , we define v +β by (v +β)(S) = v(S)+ ∑ i∈S β i for all S ⊆ N , S ̸ = ∅. We say that a game v is strategically equivalent to w if there exists a vector β ∈ R n such that
∈ S. For a game v ∈ Γ and a permutation π of N , we define πv by πv(S) = v(πS) for all S ⊆ N , S ̸ = ∅. We give axioms satisfied by a solution function ψ.
Weak Strategic Invariance For any
v ∈ Γ N and β ∈ R n , we have ψ(v + β) = ψ(v) + β. Efficiency For any v ∈ Γ N , ∑ i∈N ψ i (v) = v(N ).
Null Player Property
Symmetry Let v ∈ Γ be a game and π be a permutation of N such that
Both the Shapley value and the prenucleolus satisfy all axioms above.
Extension of basis
In Yokote et al. (2013), we introduced the commander gameū T for each coalition T ∈ 2 N \∅. The gameū T is defined as follows:ū T (S) = 1 if |S ∩T | = 1 and 0 otherwise. On the other hand, the well-known unanimity game u T , introduced by Shapley (1953) , is defined as follows: u T (S) = 1 if |S ∩T | = |T | and 0 otherwise. The two games capture two extreme cases. In the gamē u T , only one player in T yields payoff, while in the game u T , cooperation of all players in T yields payoff. We consider the intermediate between the two extreme cases.
Let Shapley (1953) and Yokote et al. (2013) respectively proved that the set {u T } T ∈2 N \∅ and {ū T } T ∈2 N \∅ are bases of Γ. In this section, we show that we can also construct a basis by using the gameū k T . In order to do that, we need a specific relationship between the size of coalition T and the number of intersection k. Let us introduce a function that is used to describe the relationship. Consider a function l : {1, · · · , n} → {1, · · · , n} satisfying the following conditions:
We have the following result:
Theorem 1 Let l be a function which satisfies C1 and C2. Then, the set of games {ū
Theorem 1 generalizes the result by Shapley (1953) and Yokote et al. (2013) in that both sets {u T } T ∈2 N \∅ and {ū T } T ∈2 N \∅ can be expressed by {ū
with a function l satisfying C1 and C2. Before giving a precise proof, we explain the outline. The proof highly relies on the following lemma saying that the gameū k T can be expressed by the addition of games with the superscript k − 1:
.
For the proof of this lemma, see Appendix. The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds by induction. First, it is already proved that the set {ū
N \∅ is a basis. Given this inductive base, we increase the sum of the number of superscripts. The inductive step is completed by using Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. We introduce three notations with respect to the function l.
, the proof is completed by the result of Yokote (2013) . We establish the inductive step. Suppose that the result holds for all l such that l satisfies C1, C2, and n ≤ K(l) ≤ p. We prove the result for K(l) = p + 1, where n ≤ p ≤ n(n+1) 2 − 1. Assume, by way of contradiction, that the set of gamesū
Let q ≥ 2 denote the natural number such that l(q) = M (l) and q ≤ k for all k ∈ Q(l). Then, the following equation holds:
From equation (1), we have ∑
By applying Lemma 1, we have ∑
We define l ′ by
We show that l ′ satisfies C1 and C2. Since q ≥ 2, l
, which proves C2. By using the function l ′ , equation (2) can be written as follows:
Since K(l ′ ) ≤ p, equation (3) contradicts the induction hypothesis.
As Yokote et al. (2013) proved, the set {ū 1 T } ∅̸ =T ⊆N has two desirable properties. First, when we express a game v by a linear combination of the basis, the coefficients related to singletons coincide with the Shapley value. Second, the set of games defined for coalitions with no less than 2-players spans the null space of the Shapley value. In order that the new basis {ū
has the same property, we need additional conditions on the function l. The important fact here is that, in order to induce the null space of the Shapley value, the worth of the grand coalition in the gameū
must be equal to 0. In other words, we must have l(|T |) < |T | for T ⊆ N , |T | ≥ 2. So, we consider a function l : {1, · · · , n} → {1, · · · , n} which satisfies the following conditions: 
where the fourth equality holds from ϕ i (ū 
Basis and coincidence condition
The purpose of this section is to give sufficient conditions under which the Shapley value coincides with the prenucleolus by using the basis introduced in Section 3.
Let us consider the following function f : 2 N → N:
if |T | is an even number, |T | ≥ 2.
1 These equations immediately follow from null player property and efficiency. 
Note that, from Theorem 2,
The game v Sh is called the excess game with respect to the Shapley value. For any v ∈ Γ, we define
Theorem 3 Let v ∈ Γ. Then, ϕ(v) = ν(v) if at least one of the following conditions holds:
Condition 1: T, T ′ ∈ 2 N \∅ and |T | = |T ′ | ≥ 2 imply q(T, v) = q(T ′ , v).
Condition 2: T ∈ Q(v) implies |T | is an even number.

Condition 3: T, T ′ ∈ Q(v) and T
We divide the remaining part into three subsections and prove each condition of Theorem 3. It will be proved that Condition 1 is equivalent to saying that that game v is strategically equivalent to a symmetric game, and Condition 2 is equivalent to PS property introduced by Kar et al. (2009) . Condition 3 is a new condition in this paper.
Proof of Condition 1
We prove that v is strategically equivalent to a symmetric game if and only if v satisfies Condition 1. We say that a game v ∈ Γ is symmetric if
|S| = |T | implies v(S) = v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N.
From Symmetry, the coincidence between ϕ and ν immediately follows in symmetric games.
Proposition 1 Let v ∈ Γ. Then, v is strategically equivalent to a symmetric game if and only if v satisfies Condition 1.
Proof. Let k ∈ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ n. We define the gameū k bȳ
Letk = f (T ), where T is a coalition such that |T | = k. In this game, we haveū
It follows thatū k is a symmetric game. The set of symmetric games is a linear subspace of R 2 n −1 , and the dimension is equal to n. Since the set of games {ū k } n k=1 is linearly independent, the set spans the space. As a result, we obtain the following statement:
A game v is symmetric if and only if T, T
Now, the change in the coefficients q({i}, v), i ∈ N , corresponds strategically equivalent transformation, so the proof is completed.
Proof of Condition 2
We prove that Condition 2 is equivalent to PS property introduced by Kar et al. (2009) . Let us review the definition. A game v ∈ Γ satisfies PS property if the following condition is satisfied: for any i ∈ N , there exists c i ∈ R such that
The condition says that, for any player i, the sum of marginal contributions to a coalition and its complement is always constant. We have the following result: . It follows that
It is worth mentioning that if |T | is an odd number, then the above equality does not necessarily hold. On the other hand, PS property can be characterized as follows:
Lemma 2 Let v ∈ Γ. Then, v satisfies PS property if and only if v
For the proof, see Appendix.
Let us give an additional notation. For a coalition T ∈ 2 N \∅, we define
We can easily check that the following equation holds: for any T ∈ 2 N \∅,
We now give a precise proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let Γ P S denote the set of all games which satisfy PS property. Then, from Lemma 2,
We define the set of games Γ Q by
Our final goal is to prove that Γ P S = Γ Q . Take an arbitrary player k ∈ N and fix. We define
) .
Claim 1 The set of games {e T,N \T
From linearity of the Shapley value, ∑
By substituting equation (7) to equation (6), we have ∑
we obtain v ∈ Γ * . Proof of Γ * ⊆ Γ P S : Take an arbitrary game v ∈ Γ * . Then, from Claim 1, there exists a unique vector (
From Linearity of the Shapley value and equation (5), we have
From Theorem 2, the set of games {ū
By substituting equation (9) to equation (8), we obtain
Since the set of games {ū
\∅} is a basis of Γ, we must have
By substituting equation (10) to equation (8), we have
From Claim 2, our final goal is to prove that Γ * = Γ Q . Clearly, Γ Q ⊆ Γ * holds. In order to prove that the converse set-inclusion holds, we prove that
Proof of Condition 3
In order to prove Condition 3, we give some preliminaries. For a subset T ⊆ 2 N \∅, we define χ T by
We define Shapley collection introduced by Chang and Tseng (2009) . We say that a subset T ⊆ 2 N \∅ is a Shapley collection if the following condition is satisfied:
For a coalition T ∈ 2 N \∅, we define
The following lemma holds:
Take any two coalitions
Consider a permutation π on N which satisfies the following conditions:
Note that the permutation π is well-defined since
The following equations are equivalent:
It follows that for any S ∈ 2 N , we have χ T (S) = χ T (πS). From Symmetry, (N, χ T ) . Efficiency completes the proof. We define three families of subsets of 2 N \N .
T is a Shapley collection}.
In the remaining part, we introduce some notations in measure theory. Let X be a set and X be a family of subsets of X. We say that X is a Dynkin class if the following three conditions are satisfied:
Lemma 4 S is a Dynkin class.
Proof.
Step 1: From symmetry,
It follows that 2 N \N ∈ S.
Step 2:
It follows that T ∈ S.
Let σ(P) denote the σ-algebra generated from P. Let D(R) denote the Dynkin class generated from R. With respect to Dynkin class, the following result is known: Remark 1 (Dynkin's π-λ theorem) Let X be a set and let X be a family of subsets of X. Suppose that T ,
This theorem implies the following lemma:
Proof. Note that from the definition of R, for any T , T ′ ∈ R, we have
where the last set-inclusion holds from Lemma 4.
We are ready to show that, under Condition 3, the Shapley value and the prenucleolus coincide. In the proof, we use the following result proved by Kohlberg (1971) : Conversely, suppose that v Sh (T ) = v Sh (N \T ) for all T ∈ 2 N . Then, for any
which means that PS property holds.
